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Abstract 
The Thatcher and Reagan administrations led a shift towards more market oriented regulation of 
economies in the Anglo-American countries, including efforts to reduce the power of organized labor. In 
this paper, we examine the development of employment and labor law in six Anglo-American countries 
(the U.S., Canada, the U.K., Ireland, Australia, and New Zealand) from the Thatcher/Reagan era to the 
present. At the outset of the Thatcher/Reagan era, the employment and labor law systems in these 
countries could be divided into three pairings: the Wagner Act model based industrial relations systems of 
the United States and Canada; the voluntarist system of collective bargaining and strong unions in the 
United Kingdom and Ireland; and the highly centralized, legalistic Award systems of Australia and New 
Zealand. Indeed, such a historical perspective contradicts the idea that there has been a longstanding 
Anglo-American model of liberal market economic ordering as has sometimes been suggested, e.g. in the 
varieties of capitalism literature. However, looking at the current state of the employment relations 
systems in these six countries, we argue that there has been growing convergence in two major areas. 
There has been a convergence in the area of labour rights toward private ordering of employment 
relations and away from the idea of work and employment being a matter subject to public ordering. By 
private ordering, we mean the idea that work and employment terms and conditions are primarily 
determined at the level of the individual organization, whether through collective bargaining between 
unions and employers at the organizational level, through individual negotiations, or through unilateral 
employer establishment of the terms and conditions of employment. The shift away from public ordering 
of work and employment is most dramatic in the cases of Australia and New Zealand, where the publicly 
established system of centralized Awards has given way to organizational level ordering of employment 
relations through workplace or individual level agreements. In the United Kingdom, the shift to greater 
private ordering is most evident in the breakdown of multi-employer collective bargaining, the weakening 
of industry wide standards enforced by strong unions, and the growth of nonunion representation at the 
enterprise level. By contrast, the much lesser degree of change in the labour rights area in North America 
reflects the historical situation that the Wagner Act model was from the outset a model built around the 
idea of private ordering. When we turn to the area of employment rights, we also see a convergence 
across the six Anglo-American countries toward a model in which the role of employment law is to 
establish a basket of minimum standards that are built into the employment relationship, which can then 
be improved upon by the parties. 
Within these general trends, we do see some variation in the degree of convergence on these models of 
labour and employment rights regulation across the Anglo-American countries. The strongest degree of 
similarity in adoption of the private ordering in labour rights and the minimum standards basket in 
employment rights is found in four of the countries: Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand and, with 
recent legislative changes, Australia. Each of these countries has adopted labour laws that favour 
organizational level economic ordering, but with reasonably substantial protections of trade union 
organizing and bargaining rights, and a set of minimum employment standards that includes similar sets 
of minimum wage, basic leave entitlements and unfair dismissal protections. 
The first outlier in this study is Ireland. The Irish employment relations system stands out as the only one 
that has continued to have a significant degree of central coordination and public ordering of employment 
relations. Although there is substantial coordination at the central level, at the organizational level, the 
Irish system resembles the other Anglo-American countries much more closely, suggesting that it has the 
potential to evolve in a similar direction. The other outlier is the United States. Structurally its system is 
similar to the other Anglo-American countries in emphasizing private ordering in labour law and the role 
of employment law as being to establish a minimum basket of basic standards. However, where the 
United States diverges from the other countries is that its system has involved a general favouring of the 
interests of employers over those of employees and organized labour in the implementation of the model. 
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Abstract
The Thatcher and Reagan administrations led a shift towards more market oriented regulation 
of economies in the Anglo-American countries, including efforts to reduce the power of 
organized labor. In this paper, we examine the development of employment and labor law in six 
Anglo-Ameri can countries (the U.S., Canada, the U.K., Ireland, Australia, and New Zealand) 
from the Thatcher/Reagan era to the present. At the outset of the Thatcher/Reagan era, the 
employment and labor law system s in these countries could be divided into three pairings: the 
Wagner Act model based industrial relations sy stem s of the United States and Canada; the 
voluntarist system of collective bargaining and strong unions in the United Kingdom and 
Ireland; and the highly centralized, legalistic Award system s of Australia and New Zealand. 
Indeed, such a historical perspective contradicts the idea that there has been a longstanding 
Anglo-Ameri can model of liberal market economic ordering as has sometimes been suggested, 
e.g. in the varieties of capitalism literature. However, looking at the current state of the 
employment relations sy stems in these si x countries, we argue that there has been growing 
convergence in two major areas.
There has been a convergence in the area of labour rights toward private ordering of 
employment relations and away from the idea of work and employment being a matter subject 
to public ordering. By private ordering, we mean the idea that work and employment term s and 
conditions are primarily determined at the level of the individual organization, whether through 
collective bargaining between unions and employers at the organizational level, through 
individual negotiations, or through unilateral employer establishment of the terms and 
conditions of employment. The shift away from public ordering of work and employment is most 
dramatic in the cases of Australia and New Zealand, where the publicly established system of 
centralized Awards has given way to organizational level ordering of employment relations 
through workplace or individual level agreements. In the United Kingdom, the shift to greater 
private ordering is most evident in the breakdown of multi-employer collective bargaining, the 
weakening of industry wide standards enforced by strong unions, and the growth of nonunion 
representation at the enterprise level. By contrast, the much lesser degree of change in the 
labour rights area in North America reflects the historical situation that the Wagner Act model 
was from the outset a model built around the idea of private ordering. When we turn to the area 
of employment rights, we also see a convergence across the six Anglo-American countries 
toward a model in whi ch the role of employment law i s to establish a basket of minimum 
standards that are built into the employment relationship, which can then be improved upon by 
the parties.
Within these general trends, we do see some variation in the degree of convergence on these 
models of labour and employment rights regulation across the Anglo-American countries. The 
strongest degree of similarity in adoption of the private ordering in labour rights and the 
minimum standards basket in employment rights is found in four of the countries: Canada, the 
United Kingdom, New Zealand and, with recent legislative changes, Australia. Each of these 
countries has adopted labour laws that favour organizational level economic ordering, but with 
reasonably substantial protections of trade union organizing and bargaining rights, and a set of 
minimum employment standards that includes sim ilar sets of minimum wage, basic leave 
entitlements and unfair dismissal protections.  
The first outlier in this study is Ireland. The Irish employment relations system stands out as the 
only one that has continued to have a si gnificant degree of central coordination and public 
ordering of employment relations. Although there is substantial coordination at the central level, 
at the organizational level, the Irish system resembles the other Anglo-American countries 
much more closely, suggesting that it has the potential to evolve in a similar direction. The other 
outlier is the United States. Structurally its system is similar to the other Anglo-American 
countries in emphasizing private ordering in labour law and the role of employment law as 
being to establish a minimum basket of basic standards. However, where the United States 
diverges from the other countries is that its system has involved a general favouring of the 
interests of employers over those of employees and organized labour in the implementation of 
the model. 
Introduction
It is commonly viewed that there has long been an ‘Anglo-American’ model of industrial and 
employment relations characterised by a liberal market ordering of the econom y (Hall and 
Soskice 2001).  Hi storically, however, this was not the case and there was considerable 
variation in the industrial relations system s among English speaking countries.  Indeed, there 
were three distinct models: a voluntarist system (with implict state support) shared between 
Britain and Ireland;  a unique Award system founded on conciliation and arbitration whi ch 
prevailed in Australia and New Zealand; and the legally regulated Wagner Act framework which 
was shared between the United States and Canada.  While these models shared some 
underpinnings, such as their common law foundations, it was their distinctiveness which was 
most notable.
Over the past 25 years, however, there has been substantial convergence in the legal 
foundations of the industrial relations sy stem s in these six countries as the voluntarist and 
award models have broken down and been replaced by new l egal frameworks.  A common 
‘Anglo-American’ model has now emerged, premised on a private ordering of industrial and 
employment relations practices, rather than the public ordering which was an important 
dimension of the voluntarist and Award models.  The shared mode of regulation is designed to 
assist managerial flexibility and facilitate a divergence in employment practices between firm s.  
There are similar practices with respect collective representation, in such dimensions as union 
recognition, non-union form s of representation, and strikes and lockouts.  The collective model 
is underpinned by a common structure of ‘fairness standard’ individual protections on such 
issues as dismissal and minimum term s and conditions.  Yet while there has been convergence, 
divergence remains.   T hi s is so in Ireland, where national partnership agreements play a 
si gnificant role, and in the United States, where the interests of employers are paramount and 
neither collective nor individual protections as robust as elsewhere.
Dynamics of Collective Representation Systems
Since the early 1980s there has been much turbulence and change in comparative systems of 
labour regulation and representation.  This is most commonly associated with Thatcher and 
Reagan in Britain and the United States respectively, though has been at least as profound in 
Australia and New Zealand.  In contrast to other countries, the framework of labour law in the 
United States and Canada has exhibited remarkable stability.  In both countries, the system of 
industrial relations was firmly built around a private ordering of affairs, with representation and 
economic negotiations centred around the firm or enterprise.  
In the United States, the National Labor Relations Act remains the statute enacted in federal 
Wagner Act of 1935 (as subsequently amended by t h e T aft -Hartley Act of 1947 and the 
Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959).  While there has been some reinterpretation of the NLRA by the 
Reagan, Clinton and Bush appointed National Labour Relations Boards, arguable more 
important have been the uses made of existing provisions of the law in recent decades and the 
change in the perceived social contract that occurred during the Reagan administration.  The 
change in practice i s particularly noteworthy in the case of the permanent replacement of 
strikers, whi ch was first facilitated by the 1939 US Supreme Court case of NLRB v. MacKay 
Radio.  This decision had limited impact on industrial relations practice until the 1981 PATCO 
dispute and significantly the 1982 Phelps-Dodge mine strike, where the employer was able to 
use permanent replacement workers to eliminate union representation at the mine.  This 
became a model for aggressive employer strategies in the 1980s and 1990s.  While 
unionisation has been declining in the United States for decades, new employer attitudes have 
contributed to a decline from 22 percent in 1980 to just 12 percent in 2006 (Katz, Kochan and 
Colvin 2007). Although it has been half a century since the last major amendments to the NLRA, 
there are major labour law reform proposals currently under debate in the U.S. Congress. The 
ultimate form of these reform proposals, if they are passed, remains to be determined by the 
American political process. However, we can see the general focus of potential change in the 
three key elements of the main reform proposal, the Employee Free Choice Act. It would: 
strengthen remedies for unfair labour practices committed by employers during organizing 
campaigns; permit certification of union representation on the basis of membership cards rather 
than a secret ballot vote; and provide for interest arbitration to determine first contracts if 
bargaining is at an impasse. While the specific provisions may be amended in the legislative 
process, the broad thrust is around an enhancement of protections for union organizing, but not 
a change in the fundamental st ructure of decentralized, mostly enterprise-level, private 
collective bargaining. In this respect, the proposed legislation would move the United States 
closer to a Canadian model of labour law, but without rejecting the basic Wagner Act framework.  
The industrial relations system in Canada has also been stable and, as in the United States, is 
based on the Wagner Act.  Although labour relations is an issue of provincial jurisdiction under 
the Canadian constitution, the Wagner Act provided the model for the initial federal law 
governing labour relations in the 1940s and subsequent provincial legislation in this area.  The 
Canadian legislation incorporated key features of Wagner Act including: exclusive 
representation of bargaining units; majority union support required for certification; duties to 
bargain on employment related matters; and the availability of strike and lockout weapons to 
support bargaining.  
At the same time, however, Canadian labour law has developed some distinct doctrines 
causing it to diverge from its neighbour, including: lack of a  bar  on employer dominated 
representation plans; use of card-check or snap elections to determine majority representation 
status; self-enforceability of labour relations board orders, use of interest arbitration as an 
alternative to strikes for first contracts; and greater limitations on the use of permanent 
replacement workers in strikes or lockouts.  In general, these differences represent a more pro-
labour slant to Canadian labour law compared to the United States.  Although there have been 
a series of amendments to existing labour laws passed in the various Canadian provinces since 
the 1980s, these represent periodic shifts in power associated with changing provincial 
governments.  However, these have occurred within a common general structure of regulation 
of labour relations, rather than entail a broader transformation.
In contrast to this pattern of stability in North America, in Britain unions faced a concerted attack 
from 1979-1997 under the Thatcher and Major governments. From the turn of the twentieth 
century the industrial relations system had been premised on a doctrine of collective laissez 
faire.  At the sam e time, however, governments consistently provided implicit support for unions 
and recognised their place in the economic order.  The result was a distinctive regulatory 
approach to relying on voluntary collective bargaining to achieve a particular normative 
outcome (Davies and Freedland 1993).  The thrust of the Thatcher reforms was to transform 
the role of unions and collective bargaining within the economy and society.  Thiswas achieved 
through a rebalancing of power, with legislation on such issues as prohibiting secondary 
picketing, compulsory ballots before strikes, and the abolition of the custom or requirement to 
recognise unions.  The redefined place of unions was not only to be on the margins of the 
economy, but also one of private ordering.
The Labour Party under Blair did not seek a reversal of this underlying philosophy and labour
law has thus continued to be used to confine collective action to the private sphere of 
ownership as an end in itself and to achieve economic goals,  with associated implications 
flexible outcomes.  However, a softening o f the extremes of T hatcherite legislation was 
introduced with the 1999 Employment Relations Act which provided unions with recognition 
rights.  The 2004 Employment Relations Act also provided some protection against employers 
offering inducements to individual employees not to belong to a trade union, responding to the 
Wilson and Palmer judgments (2002).  Individual employment protections were introduced with 
the minimum wage (1998) and limited extension of rights in areas such as unfair d i sm i ssal, 
working time, statutory holiday entitlement, parental leave, part -time rights and age 
discrimination.  These actions, sometimes prompted by European Union directives, have been 
restricted in their scope.
Ireland has trodden a different path, despite its common industrial relations heritage with Britain.  
While the constitution gives a right to join a trade union, it does not give a corresponding 
obligation on employers to recognise  or bargain with them.  Nevertheless, the role of unions 
within the public sphere was long accepted, with the 1946 Industrial Relations Act (and 
amendments in 1969 and 1976) having the promotion of harmonious industrial relations as a 
key objective (Kerr 1991).  The voluntarist foundation of Irish industrial relations without 
collective bargaining rights has been retained and labour law has been comparatively stable.  
The 1990 Industrial Relations Act, for example, ultimately avoided introducing a positive right to 
strike, but retained the ‘immunities’ approach dating from 1906, though with the addition of pre-
strike ballots.  The 2001 Industrial Relations Act al so avoided giving unions a right to 
recognition, even though it gave some rights to refer disputes on terms and conditions in non-
union firm s to the Labour Court.  
What has been unique in Ireland has been the great expansion of the role of unions in the 
public ordering, though successive national level ‘Partnership’ agreements from 1987.  These 
have established pay guidelines, addressed issues of public policy (such as taxation) and 
progressively expanded to broader social issues involving community and voluntary 
organisations.  For unions, this has been regarded as a protection against Thatcherite neo-
liberalism and providing union legitimacy.  This public ordering has si gnificantly facilitated 
Ireland’s remarkable economic success (Baccaro and Simoni 2007).  At the same time, 
however, the “truncated partnership” (Roche 2007) has seen tacit governmental support 
facilitating greater private ordering of employment practices at the firm level as a key route to 
attracting multi-national companies.  There is no longer any suasion on firms to recognise 
unions, density has fallen to 34 percent overall and 20 percent in the private sector, and firm s 
have substantial flexibility to construct their own affairs.  There have, however, been 14 
separate labour laws supporting individual rights, including a  national minimum wage, 
protection of part-time employees, working time, and expanded maternity rights.
The arbitration and award systems that developed in the early 20th century in Australia and New 
Zealand were premised on an understanding of the legitimate public ordering of industrial 
relations extending into encouraging union membership (through union preference clauses), 
dispute resolution, and the settlement of term s and conditions of employment such that they 
were “fair and reasonable.”  In the 1907 Harvester case, Justice Higgins came to define this as 
meaning “the normal needs of the average employee regarded as living in a  civilised 
community.”  Relating this to the humblest worker living in a household of five, this social 
dimension was evident.  Progressively, the regulatory system expanded to include establishing 
norm s on issues such as working hours, holidays, physical working conditions, periods of notice 
and the such like.  All such employment practices were deemed to be central to the public 
ordering of industrial relations.  In both countries, the system was supported by high trade tariffs.
A radical attach on the system occurred in New Zealand in 1991 with the Employment 
Contracts Act transforming the system to one of private ordering, leading to a collapse of union 
membership and density and the determination of conditions at the firm level.  The 2000 
Employment Relations Act represented a rebalancing of power, facilitating union recognition in 
particular, though very much operating within the a regime of private ordering.
In Australia, the transformation was more gradual, occurring with the 1993 Industrial Relations 
Reform Act and 1996 Workplace Relations Act progressively decentralising industrial relations 
to enterprises and allowing individual contracts, though both occurring within a framework of 
protections established by the Award system.  Strikes and lockouts were legalised.  In 2005, 
however, Australian legislation shifted dramatically to an extremely pri vate ordering of 
employment relations with Work Choices Act.  While phasing out award provisions, it also 
provided unions no right to recognition or access to the workplace, removed the right for 
workers in companies with fewer than 100 employees to seek redress for unfair dismissal and, 
remarkably, explicitly prohibits the use of pattern bargaining.  As an extreme imposition of a 
private ordering model, bargaining has to reflect the circumstances of the individual enterprise 
and unions are obliged to respond to the specific proposals of any employer.  Furthermore, 
bargaining over a range of issues i s p rohibited, as distinct from the distinction between 
mandatory and permissive subjects in the United States.  These include union involvement in 
the workplace, additional unfair dism i ssal protections, and the hiring of agency or contract 
workers.  While minimum wage legislation replaced the award system, the legislation imposed
si gnificant constraints on the ability of unions to strike while allowing offensive lockouts.
With the defeat of the Howard government in the 2007 federal elections, where industrial 
relations reform was a major issue, Australian industrial relations policy underwent another shift. 
In 2009, the Rudd-led Labour Party government passed the new Fair Work Act, which reversed 
some, though not all, of the changes that been enacted under the previous Work Choices Act. 
Most notabl y, it abolishes statutory individual contracts (the AWAs) and returns the focus to 
collective bargaining as the primary mechanism for establishing terms and conditions of 
employment (Landsbury 2009). The legislation includes a mixture of expanded rights for unions 
and some continued limitations. Employers will be required to bargaining in good faith with 
unions, there will be a st rong ‘no disadvantage’ test for all agreements (relative to general 
employment standards), and union representatives will have rights of access to workplaces, 
including workplaces where they do not have existing members. On the other hand, restrictions 
on secondary boycotts are maintained and the legislation allows for non-union collective 
bargaining (though from the perspective of industrial relations theory we question to what 
degree it is accurate to classify a group of workers bargaining collectively with their employer as 
“non-union” rather as an unaffiliated or independent union). Overall what the new legislation 
does is to strengthen the position of unions compared to the nadir of the Work Choices Act, but 
in a framework that with its emphasis on private enterprise-level bargaining much more closely 
resembles the North American Wagner Act model. 
The pattern of labour law changes has led to a decline in the public ordering of industrial 
relations and a convergence in the realms of collective labour rights and individual employment 
rights.  There do remain, however, differences across the countries examined.  Union 
recognition is now the norm, though there are operational differences. While Canada has the 
potential for card check and snap elections, the slow process and campaigning in the United 
States inhibits the ability of the unions to gain bargaining rights.  The British system represents 
a hybrid while in New Zealand rights have been restored.  Ireland and Australia stand apart in
not having recognition rights.  The preservation of the voluntarist model in Ireland has occurred 
in spite of continuing declines in union membership and the national partnership agreements.  
The dramatic change under the Work Choices Act to  curtail recognition or good faith bargaining 
rights in Australia was extreme, though was ultimately not sustained following the change in 
government and enactment of the Fair Work Act of 2009.  While the United States prohibits 
non-union collective representation through 8(a)2 of the NLRA, this is allowed in other countries.   
In Canada non-union collective representation is allowed by the absence of an equivalent to the 
8(a)(2) ban in Canadian versions of the Wagner Act model and in Australia the Fair Work Act of 
2009 expressly provides for legal recognition of non-union collective bargaining.
While Britain and Ireland have retained a basic structure of ‘immunities’ as opposed to a right to 
strike, the introduction of a system of rights to strike in aid of collective bargaining in Australia 
and New Zealand (which was contrary to the arbitration and award system in theory, if not in 
practice) has meant a formal convergence with the North Ameri can model that has always 
contained this explicit legal support for the right to strike in support of bargaining.   Some 
differences remain in thi s area as well. In Britain, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand, 
authorisation for strikes requires ballots of differing degrees of complexity though such 
requirements are absent in the United States and Canada.  Permanent replacement of strikers 
is permitted in the United States, while this is true in Canada only for temporary replacements
and in Britain from 2004 onwards workers on strike have received protection from dismissal for 
12 weeks. Overall though, in the recognition and regulation of strikes a s the primary economic 
weapon of unions in support of collective bargaining, we see a general trend of convergence 
across the Anglo-American countries, paralleling the convergence in other areas of labour law 
and collective representation.
Individual Employment Rights
As in the area of collective labour representation, when we look at individual employment rights 
regimes there has been a substantial shift in the structure of regulation in some of the countries 
examined but less so in others. We will focus our comparison here on three basic areas of 
individual employment rights: minimum wage and hours laws; general benefits and leave 
entitlements; and unfair dismissal.
Minimum wage and hours laws have been a basic component of employment standards 
regulation in the North American countries since the mid-twentieth century. In the United States, 
the Fair Labour Standards Act of 1938 establish a national minimum wage and entitlements to 
overtime pay (time-and-a-half of regular pay) for work in excess of forty hours in a week. This 
minimum set of term s of employment has been a stable part of U.S. employment standards law 
si nce that time, with periodic adjustments to the value of the minimum wage and to the 
definition of the categories of workers entitled to overtime (exempt, mostly managerial and 
professional, versus nonexempt, typically nonmanagerial, workers) pay. The Canadian 
provinces enacted similar minimum wage and overtime pay regimes relatively soon after the 
U.S. These employment standards laws in Canada have stayed relatively stable in the areas of 
minimum wages and overtime pay, however with some expansion to include additional 
minimum terms of employment such as minimum vacation leave entitlements. 
Employment law in the United Kingdom and Ireland traditionally lacked any provision for a 
minimum wage. In the U.K., a similar function was partly served by the system of wage councils.  
Under the Labour government of Tony Blair, however, the U.K. moved for the first time to enact 
a national minimum wage. The National Minimum Wage Act of 1998 established the Low Pay 
Commission to advise the government on minimum wage levels, which was established in 1999 
at an initial level of £3.60 and by 2007 had risen to £5.52. Ireland similarly established its first 
national minimum wage law in 2000, which currently stands at €8.65 per hour.
In Australia and New Zealand, the centralized Award system s traditionally obviated the need for 
minimum wage laws by establishing generally applicable terms and conditions of employment, 
including standard pay levels. With the demise of the Award  system s, both countries have 
moved to establish minimum wage laws. Reflecting the continued influence of the former Award 
system, the Australian federal minimum wage is a relatively high AU$13.47 (US$12.50). 
However, changes enacted in conjunction with the Howard Government’s Work Choices 
legislation raised concerns that there would be a gradual deterioration of this high minimum 
wage level through limited adjustments for inflation or ri si ng general wage levels. The Rudd 
government’s new Fair Work Act partly reverses these changes by providing for a basic set of 
10 national employment standards that will be monitored and enforced by a new federal 
government agency called Fair Work Australia. The new national employment standards 
provide an expanded basic  set of protections in areas such as hours of work, vacations, and 
redundancy pay, but they are al so structured on the model of providing a basket of general 
minimum employment standards, as opposed to the old award system model of comprehensive 
centrally determined terms and conditions of employment. In New Zealand employment law 
also now i s structured around a set of basic employment standards, albeit sim ilarly the 
minimum wage level is relatively high by international standards at NZ$11.25 an hour. Although 
these minimum wage and other employment standards levels are relatively high compared to 
their North American counterparts, the significant change to note in both countries is the shift in 
mechanism for wage regulation away from the establishment of general wage levels and 
towards a system of minimum wages with most employment relationships typically involving the 
establishment of higher wage levels, either through direct employer wage setting or collective or 
individual negotiations. 
Most of the Anglo-American countries also provide some basic entitlement to parental leave. In 
Canada, a combination of 15 weeks maternity and 35 weeks paternity leave paid through the 
unemployment insurance system provides up to close to a year of paid leave after the birth of a 
child. The United Kingdom provides for 52 weeks maternity leave, of which 39 weeks are paid 
leave. Ireland provides for 26 weeks paid maternity leave and an additional 16 weeks unpaid 
parental leave. New Zealand provides for 14 weeks paid maternity leave and an additional 38 
weeks unpaid paternity leave. Australia is more limited in this area in providing for one year of 
unpaid parental leave. The United States, however, standards out for having by far the most 
limited benefit, with only 12 weeks unpaid leave being provided under the Family and Medical 
Leave Act, which is further limited to larger employers and as a result only covers around 40% 
of the workforce.
A similar pattern holds in the area of minimum standards for vacation or holiday leave. Most of 
the Anglo-American countries have generally similar basic minimum vacation entitlements 
enacted in employment law: 4.8 weeks in the United Kingdom; 4 weeks in Ireland; 4 weeks in 
New Zealand; and 4 weeks in Australia. In Canada, the amount varies by province, with two 
weeks being a common minimum entitlement, though in some provinces this rises with years of 
service, e.g. 2 weeks initial and then 3 weeks after 5 years of service in British Columbia and 
Alberta. The major exception is again in the United States, where there is no minimum vacation 
entitlement in employment law. 
In the area of unfair dism i ssal, we find across most of the Anglo-American countries the 
establishment of some basic protections against wrongful termination of employment. In the 
United Kingdom, employees since the 1970s have had legal protections against unfair 
dismissal, enforceable through the Employment Tribunals system. Ireland and New Zealand 
similarly provide protection against unfair dism i ssal in their employment law system. Until 
recently, Australia could also have been described as providing general protections against 
unfair dismissal. However, one of the major features of the 2005 Work Choices legislation was 
the removal of unfair dism i ssal protections for employees of employers with fewer than 100 
employees. Restoration of unfair dismissal protections for this class of employees is one of the 
key changes to the Work Choices legislation contained in the new Fair Work Act. North 
American presents a contrast in this area. Canadian employment law provides for protection 
against unfair dismissal through a combination of employment standards legislation and 
common law rights against wrongful dismissal. Rather than reinstatement, however, the 
standard remedy for unfair di smi ssal in Canadian employment law is damages equivalent to 
lost salary or wages for a period equal to what the employer should have provided in 
reasonable notice before di smi ssal (Colvin 2006). This can be a substantial amount, as much 
as one month per year of service under common law rights. The United States is an outlier in 
the area of unfai r di smi ssal. The general employment law in the U.S. continues to be 
employment-at-will, under which an employer may dismiss an employee for “good reason, bad 
reason, or no reason at all”, without any requirement of notice or severance pay. The most 
important exception to this rule is that U.S. law does prohibit di scrimination in employment. 
Employment discrimination claims can be pursued through the general court system, commonly 
involving jury trials with the potential fo r much larger damage awards than found in other 
countries. The result of concerns about major damage awards if an employment decision is 
found to be tinged by discriminatory motives is that American employers tend to exercise a 
degree of caution in dismissal decision-making that does not reflect the seeming high degree of 
flexibility inherent in the employment-at-will rule (Colvin 2006). 
Analysis and Conclusions
If we had conducted a similar comparison of the six countries examined in this study in 1980 at 
the outset of the Thatcher/Reagan era, the story we would have told would have emphasized 
the si gnificant variation that exi sted across the Anglo-American countries. We could have 
divided the countries into three pairings: the Wagner Act model based industrial relations 
systems of the United States and Canada; the voluntarist system of collective bargaining and 
strong unions in the United Kingdom and Ireland; and the highly centralized, legalistic Award 
systems of Australia and New Zealand. Indeed, such a hi stori cal perspective contradicts the 
idea that there has been a longstanding Anglo-American model of liberal market economic 
ordering as has sometimes been suggested, e.g. in the varieties of capitalism literature (Hall 
and Soskice 2002). However, looking at the current state of the employment relations system s 
in these six countries, we argue that there has been growing convergence in two major areas.
There has been a convergence in the area of labour rights toward private ordering of 
employment relations and away from the idea of work and employment being a matter subject 
to public ordering. By private ordering, we mean the idea that work and employment terms and 
conditions are primarily determined at the level of the individual organization, whether through 
collective bargaining between unions and employers at the organizational level, through 
individual negotiations, or through unilateral employer establishment of the terms and 
conditions of employment. The shift away from public ordering of work and employment is most 
dramatic in the cases of Australia and New Zealand, where the publicly established system of 
centralized Awards has given way to organizational level ordering of employment relations 
through workplace or individual level agreements. In the United Kingdom, the shift to greater 
private ordering is most evident in the breakdown of multi-employer collective bargaining, the 
weakening of industry wide standards enforced by strong unions, and the growth of nonunion 
representation at the enterprise level. By contrast, the much lesser degree of change in the 
labour rights area in North America reflects the historical situation that the Wagner Act model 
was from the outset a model built around the idea of private ordering. The system of primarily 
enterprise level union organizing and collective bargaining i s premised on the idea the 
individual organization i s the appropriate level for determination of work and employment 
conditions. The areas where we have seen change in North America, such as the breakdown of 
multi-employer and pattern bargaining, reflect a deterioration of a superstructure o f p artial 
public ordering built on top of the basic Wagner Act model during the 1950s through the 1970s. 
When we turn to the area of employment rights, we also see a convergence across the si x 
Anglo-Ameri can countries toward a model in which the role of employment law is to establish a 
basket of minimum standards that are built into the employment relationship, which can then be 
improved upon by the parties. Again, the shift has been particularly dramatic in the cases of 
Australia and New Zealand, with the previous Award model involving the direct establishment of 
general term s and conditions of employment being replaced, in part, by employment laws that 
establish minimum wages and other basic standards for employment. In the United Kingdom 
and Ireland by contrast, the shift has been toward a greater formalization of minimum standards 
of employment through expanded employment laws, such as the minimum wage, in contrast to 
the earlier system of voluntarism. Again change in this a rea has been less significant in North 
America because the system of employment regulation was historically based on the concept of 
employment law as establishing a minimum basket of employment standards, through the Fair 
Labour Standards Act in the U.S. and its Canadian counterparts. 
Within these general trends, we do see some variation in the degree of convergence on these 
models of labour and employment rights regulation across the Anglo-American countries. The 
strongest degree of similarity in adoption of the private ordering in labour rights and the 
minimum standards basket in employment rights is found in three of the countries: Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and New Zealand. Each of these countries has adopted labour laws that 
favour organizational level economic ordering, but with reasonably substantial protections of 
trade union organizing and bargaining rights, and a set of minimum employment standards that 
includes similar sets o f minimum wage, basic leave entitlements and unfair dismissal 
protections. Australia had moved toward a similar set of labour and employment laws up until 
the 2005 Work Choices legislation, whi ch moved its employment relations system in a 
si gnificantly more pro-employer direction through major labour law restrictions on trade union 
activities and removal of unfair dism i ssal protections for employees of sm all to m id-sized 
employers. However, the new Fair Work Act legislation passed by the Rudd-led Labour Party 
government moves Australia back into line with the other three countries. One interesting 
indicator of the degree of convergence across these four countries is the relative similarity 
between them in union representation levels. Whereas in 1980 union representation varied 
between 30-35 percent in Canada and over 50 percent in the Australia, New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom, current overall union representation levels in all four countries is around 20-30 
percent, with similar private sector union representation levels of 15-20 percent.
The first outlier in this study is Ireland. The Irish employment relations system stands out as the 
only one that has continued to have a si gnificant degree of central coordination and public 
ordering of employment relations. This may be explainable in part by the remarkable success of 
the Irish economy in recent years and the desire of all parties to continue the conditions that 
have led to the ri se  of  the “Celtic tiger”. The question for the future  i s whether thi s central 
coordination between labour, employers, and government will continue if the Irish econom y hits 
a downturn. Although there is substantial coordination at the central level, at the organizational 
level, the Irish system resembles the other Anglo-American countries much more closely, 
suggesting that it has the potential to evolve in a similar direction.     
The other outlier is the United States. Structurally its system is similar to the other Anglo-
American countries in emphasizing private ordering in labour law and the role of employment 
law as being to establish a minimum basket of basic standards. However, where the United 
States diverges from the other countries is that its system has involved a general favouring of 
the interests of employers over those of employees and organized labour in the implementation 
of the model. In the area of labour law, this can be seen in areas such as the relatively weak 
enforcement of the right to organize and the limitation of the right to strike through the ability of 
employers to hire permanent replacement workers. In the area of employment law, a similar 
emphasis on employer interests can be seen in the continued use of the employment-at-will 
rule barring most actions for unfair dismissal and in the limited extent of minimum employment 
standards, such as the lack of paid sick leave or vacation entitlements. If some version of the 
Employee Free Choice Act is enacted into law, the United States may move closer to the other 
Anglo-Ameri can countries in its regulation of collective representation. As of yet however, there 
is less indication of a move toward substantial reform of the American sy stem of much more 
limited employment laws and standards than found in the other countries. Absent such a 
change it is possible that in coming years, it will be in the area of employment standards rather 
than labour law that we see American exceptionalism as being the most notable variation within 
the general Anglo-American model.  
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